Tag Archive | "South Korea"

How Might Joe Biden as President Deal with Korea?

By Robert R. King

In 2001, Senator Joe Biden became Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  At the time, I was Chief of Staff for Congressman Tom Lantos of California, who had just became Ranking Democratic Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee earlier that same year.  Before Lantos’ election to Congress, he had spent a few years in the late 1970s as a senior foreign policy advisor to Biden, and the two of them had become close friends.  They had traveled together internationally on many occasions, and after 1981 when both were serving in Congress, they worked together on a number of international projects.

Lantos set up a meeting in 2001 to talk with Biden about how the two might work together on a number of fractious foreign affairs issues since both were the leading Democrats of the foreign policy committees of the House and the Senate.  We met in Biden’s personal office in the Russel Senate Office Building, and as Democratic Staff Director Lantos invited me to join the meeting with Biden and his committee chief of staff.

We arrived just as Biden got back from a vote in the Senate chamber, and we were together for an hour or so before Lantos had to hurry back for a vote in the House of Representatives.  The meeting began with Biden discussing in great detail the previous evening’s episode of The West Wing—the American serial political drama (1999-2006) which was widely praised by critics, political science professors, former White House staffers, and which received 26 Prime Time Emmy awards including four awards for Outstanding Drama Series.

Biden was deeply into the issues raised in that television episode.  He had been a presidential candidate for a time during the 1988 campaign, and he was known to have presidential ambitions.  After hearing his analysis of The West Wing it was clear to me that he was still interested.  Biden’s interest in The West Wing episode focused on two issues:  how do you define what is the right decision on a public policy issue and how carry it out within a democratic system that requires approval of a fractious Congress and everything is done in the media spotlight.  His analysis convinced me he understood the political process and he had the right values.

With Joe Biden now President-elect Biden, pundits and astrologers are beginning the parlor game “What will President Biden do about _____ [insert your favorite issue].”  Unlike the election of Donald Trump four years ago, we have a much better idea of what Biden is likely to do.  He has a long track record in the realm of public policy, while Trump’s previous experience was limited to being a reality television personality and selling his name on properties whose mortgages were held by Russian oligarchs and Saudi princes.

Biden was a United States Senator for 36 years, and he was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for that time.  He was chair of the committee for 3½ years and it’s Ranking Democratic Member for 8½ years.   Most recently he served 8 years as Vice President, where he was involved in the highest level discussions, particularly on foreign affairs.  The principal reason Biden was chosen to be President Obama’s running mate in 2008 was his foreign policy experience, which Obama lacked.

What could we expect President-elect Biden to do with regard to policy on Korea when he moves into the Oval Office?  What might be different than what we have seen over the last four years?

Likely Policies toward South Korea

Biden gave a “Special contribution” to Yonhap, a principal South Korean news agency, that provides some indication of the President-elect’s thoughts on Korea policy.  The piece entitled “Hope for Our Better Future” was principally focused on issues that Korean-Americans would be most concerned about—immigration to the United States, the failure of President Trump to deal with the Covid pandemic, and economic recovery.  He also emphasized the South Korean and United States cooperation and sacrifice in the Korean War.

A couple of sentences were particularly forward-looking:  “As President, I’ll stand with South Korea, strengthening our alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia and beyond, rather than extorting Seoul with reckless threats to remove our troops.  I’ll engage in principled diplomacy and keep pressing toward a denuclearized North Korea and a unified Korean Peninsula, while working to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades.”

Biden has been a particularly vocal advocate of United States allies, and he has supported international cooperation to deal with common international problems.  Trump, on the other hand, has disengaged with the international community.  It is been not just “America first,” but America alone.  Trump has demanded that South Korea (and Japan) pay considerably more to maintain U.S. troops there, and his belligerent pressure tactics reflect his background as a brash real estate mogul rather than a diplomatic approach to a common national security problem for both the U.S. and South Korea.  This is very much like pulling out of the World Health Organization and defaulting on a $62 million obligation to the UN agency in the midst of an international pandemic.

United States relations with South Korea are impacted by the U.S.-China relationship, and even under Biden there are likely to be issues that will require diplomatic effort to navigate.  Biden, however, will be more sophisticated in diplomacy.  Trump thinks in terms of his real estate tycoon Art of the Deal mentality, whereas Biden understands the importance of careful diplomatic negotiation.

Likely Policies Toward North Korea

Look for less focus on summit meetings with the North Korean leader from President Biden.  In less than two years President Trump has met three times with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.  Despite international media frenzy for all three meetings, the President has little to show for his effort.  The Singapore summit (June 2018) received international attention, the United States received 55 sets of remains, some of which may be U.S. military servicemen.  The Hanoi summit (February 2019) ended abruptly and before final meetings were held with recriminations for the failure.  The third meeting was a hand-shake at the DMZ border with nothing of substance accomplished.

The principal reason for the failure of the meetings was that senior staff were not given the mandate to pull together agreements that both sides were willing to accept.  The two leaders exchanged “beautiful letters,” “love letters,” but nothing of substance resulted.  As one Biden advisor said “There’s no question that the era of love letters will be over.”  Look for Biden to meet with Kim only if a meeting has been thoroughly prepared in advance.  A photo op will not be enough to justify a meeting with the President of the United States.

North Korea seems to have missed the possibility that Vice President Biden might become the U.S. President, because they have been especially negative in name calling the United States’ new leader.  A year ago in November 2019, the North Korean news agency KCNA was particularly critical of Joe Biden, then one of several Democratic candidates for President.  (Keep in mind that in North Korea KCNA is the official voice of the government—the equivalent of the White House spokesperson, not something like The Washington Post or CNN expressing a point of view.)

Biden was repeatedly called a dog—“a rabid dog only keen on getting at other’s throats. . . . wandering about like a starving field dog. . . . No wonder, even the Americans call him ‘1% Biden’ with low I.Q. . . . ‘mad Biden’”  He “had the temerity to dare slander the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK,” and this “was the last-ditch efforts of the rabid dog expecting his death.”

The era of “love letters” with North Korea may be over, but that does not mean that the United States will end its efforts to engage North Korea and reach a deal on denuclearization. But it will take a different approach, one that is less personal and more professional. A more professional approach to North Korea and a focus on restoring trust in the U.S.-Korea alliance are two key changes that we should expect from President-elect Biden.

Robert R. King is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America.  He is former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights.  The views expressed here are his own.   

Image from Gage Skidmore’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

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Corporate Market Power And Consumer Rights

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • Pointing to the fact that large foreign firms are allowed to sell used cars in Korea, domestic carmakers called for an end to restrictions on their participation in this market space.
  • The Ministry of SME’s and Startups is reportedly looking into allowing conglomerates to reenter the used car market under specific conditions.
  • 51.6% of the public is in favor of allowing conglomerates to participate in this market.

Implications: South Korean policymakers are forced to weigh between the ability of conglomerates to deliver better consumer services and the prerogative of protecting SMEs. The used car market of USD 23 billion could be quickly swallowed up by conglomerates who will likely use price competitiveness to drive out smaller competitors. Moreover, consumers have expressed frustration with the disparate pricing practices of various SME players in the market. As a result, there is widespread expectation that the entry of conglomerates into the market will not only lower prices but also increase standards. However, policymakers worry that this will help further concentrate corporate dominance over the Korean economy with potential long-term consequences on employment.

Context: Six conglomerates make up more than 70% of Korean exports. These vertically-integrated corporations also channel businesses to their subsidiaries, promoting their growth while pushing out smaller competitors. In 2011, the Fair-Trade Commission (FTC) reported that conglomerates composed nearly half of Korea’s manufacturing industry and generated 33.8% of total industry profit. In this environment, SMEs are limited in both domestic and international growth. This lopsided relationship has major consequences for employment as 80% of the labor force is in a SME. In response, the FTC has been regulating corporate expansion since 2013 – but in areas like the used car market, the poor price competitiveness and services by SMEs have led to a consumer backlash.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the flickr account of Stephan

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South Korea Demonstrates Adaptability in Privacy Protection Guidelines

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • The South Korean government is considering new ways to enhance coronavirus-related privacy protections following increasing public concern over excessive data disclosures.
  • This includes measures to remove phone numbers from handwritten visitor logs and an investigation into the functions of thermal imaging cameras with facial recognition.
  • In the meantime, as COVID-19 infection clusters continue to grow sporadically, health authorities caution the possibility of another mass outbreak.

Implications: Even as the government continues to prioritize public health amid the ongoing pandemic, its efforts to also protect personal information show that Seoul is attuned to concerns around civil liberties. Despite frequent critiques (particularly from abroad) of its stringent digital surveillance, South Korea demonstrates a willingness to address public opinion and adapt its privacy protection guidelines around contract tracing. Underpinning the decision to revise these rules is the belief among officials that public trust and cooperation are vital for containing COVID-19. As such, policymakers recognize that successfully managing the health crisis is in part contingent upon ensuring a certain degree of personal privacy.

Context: This past summer, South Korea mandated businesses to collect customer information, including names and phone numbers, as part of its effort to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. High-risk facilities like restaurants, cafes, and theaters require visitors to submit either a QRcode based entry log or a handwritten form. Many people have started questioning the effectiveness of the latter and whether it may lead to unauthorized leaks of personal information.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Jens-Olaf Walter

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Economic Concerns Dominate Political Discourse

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung and former conservative politician Yoo Seung-min exchanged barbs on social media over whether the incumbent administration has given up on economic issues.
  • This comes as controversy mounts over the lack of public relief for delivery workers who are being overworked by the retail industry.
  • The government’s failure to halt runaway housing prices continues to receive heightened attention, prompting policymakers to consider rolling back property taxes.

Implications: Despite concerns ranging from the ongoing pandemic to Pyongyang’s diplomatic intransigence, economic issues dominate the political discourse in South Korea. Housing unaffordability elicited the most scrutiny. Notably, a majority of survey respondents in their 20s and 30s – a cohort that strongly supported President Moon Jae-in in the 2017 election – expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s efforts to rein in real estate prices. Simultaneously, the government has not satisfactorily addressed concerns of marginalized workers who are overworked and underprotected by the current system. In this environment, the social media exchange between Governor Lee Jae-myung and Yoo Seung-min may foreshadow the central debate in the upcoming 2022 presidential election.

Context: The focus on bread and butter issues marks a shift in political discourse since President Moon began his term in 2017. The previous election came on the heels of popular protests against the previous administration’s corruption. Engagement with North Korea also loomed large in the first two years of President Moon’s term as Pyongyang first escalated tensions and then made peace overtures. As late as Spring 2020, the nation’s focus was on the pandemic – with the electorate rewarding the ruling party with a near-supermajority on the merits of the government’s handling of the COVID outbreak. Nonetheless, scrutiny from both the public and opposition parties are now focused on the government’s handling of the economy.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the user Republic of Korea on Flickr 

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Residual Mistrust in the Government Emerges

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • There is growing anxiety around the new flu vaccine after the deaths of at least 13 people who received shots.
  • These concerns led to the Ministry of Food and Drug and Safety recalling 615,000 doses of flu vaccines.
  • Nonetheless, South Korean authorities refused to suspend the country’s seasonal inoculation program, citing no causal links between flu shots and recent deaths.

Implications: Despite the South Korean government’s prompt response to the COVID-19 outbreak, public confidence in its public health policy remains fragile. The flu vaccine program failed to meet the heightened expectations set by the country’s successful mobilization of resources to manufacture and distribute COVID-19 test kits. This shortcoming may remind people of past cases when the Korean government failed to sufficiently protect the public from both natural and man-made disasters. More presently, the public’s skepticism of the system raises questions on its receptivity to the forthcoming COVID vaccine.

Context: In 2015, the Park Geun-hye administration was deeply criticized for its slow response to the deadly outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. Officials failed to share important information about the disease and its spread with key actors in the public health infrastructure, which led to higher infection rates and more deaths. Beyond health concerns, Korea continues to experience occasional high-profile public safety failures. These experiences may generate concerns that the government’s quick tackling of COVID-19 was an exception rather than the rule.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Republic of Korea

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Public Doubts around the Government’s Approach to Nuclear Power

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • Nuclear reactor at Wolsong-1 was closed earlier than expected after the government claimed that the reactor was not economically efficient.
  • The National Assembly commissioned an audit to verify the shut-down process after lawmakers argued that an early closure was initiated despite lack of sufficient evidence.
  • Although the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) was required to submit a final report within five months, the BAI delayed the submission several times as auditors faced difficulties in producing a unanimous conclusion on the report’s findings.

Implications: The discussion around the domestic nuclear power program raises questions on whether the government prioritizes its policy platform above economic realities. Because President Moon Jae-in came into office in 2017 with a promise to gradually phase out nuclear power plants, various voices now question whether Wolsong-1 was shuttered based on false pretenses to fulfill that election pledge. Suspicions were intensified by the head auditor’s claim that officials at the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy erased key documents. Some ruling party members also confirmed that drafts of the audit report affirmed the economic viability of nuclear energy.

Context:The South Korean government is also under severe constraints due to the growing financial burden of energy generation. Last year, public utility provider Korea Electric Power (KEPCO) faced a backlash after hinting that it might raise household electricity rates. The administration may face heavier criticism if the growing operational deficit at KEPCO is attributed to the government’s decision to phase out nuclear power plants. Taiwan currently faces a similar struggle with South Korea, weighing the merits of economic efficiency versus heightened safety concerns following the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the flickr account of the IAEA

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South Korea’s Basic Income Model Focuses on Local Growth

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • Universal basic income has gained public support in South Korea as the government attempts to ride out the economic slowdown from COVID-19.
  • Programs spearheaded by local governments that distribute cash to residents for use within the community serve as pilots for a wider proposal.
  • Receiving the most attention, the program in Gyeonggi Province pays a quarterly cash pay-outs to its residents – this program has reportedly led to a 45 percent increase in sales for local businesses.

Implications: Although the Korean government traditionally frames national economic policies as measures to boost export competitiveness, advocates for a nationwide Universal Basic Income (UBI) focus on the proposal’s benefit to local economies. This approach also differs from peer countries like Finland whose UBI pilot measured success based on its impact on employment. Similar to the direct cash payments that Seoul distributed during the height of the coronavirus outbreak, Korea’s UBI proposal promises to boost the domestic consumer market, particularly small and medium-sized businesses. Notably, provincial governments would play a key role in any prospective implementation, giving them greater scope to address issues like the income gap, etc.

ContextUnder the Youth Basic Income program, Gyeonggi Province currently provides 1 million won (USD 900) to 24 year-olds living in the region. According to a survey conducted in July 2019 by the Gyeonggi Research Institute, 80.6 percent of the youth recipients said they were satisfied with the program. Meanwhile, politicians from both sides of the aisle have grown more vocal on the issue of implementing basic income on a national level.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the flickr account of photostudio81

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South Korea Weighs Alternative Military Service Programs for Pop Culture Artists

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • Lawmakers are considering a proposal to draft BTS for a campaign to promote the Dokdo Islets in lieu of serving their traditional military duties.
  • Proponents of the idea argue that the K-pop band would help raise international visibility on the territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan over the islets.
  • This comes after BTS roared to the top of the Billboard Hot 100 songs chart with their debut English-language single “Dynamite.”

Implications: Adoption of alternative military service for pop culture icons is consistent with an existing policy framework that sees conscription exemption as a tool to elevate Korea’s international standing. Under the current Military Service Act, male athletes who win medals in the Olympic Games or gold medals in the Asian Games are granted exemptions from military service. This measure was intended to raise South Korea’s international standing during the Cold War when the country competed with North Korea for diplomatic recognition. While some groups advocate for reforms to provide young people with more freedoms, the special arrangement for pop culture icons comes from the old line of thinking that places the interest of the nation ahead of the individual.

Context: In South Korea, all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 28 are required to serve in the military for about two years as part of the country’s national defense against North Korea. While athletes have the opportunity to earn an exemption, musicians with high international visibility like BTS are not currently accorded the same privilege. The defense ministry recently announced that it is looking into an option that would allow BTS members a postponement of their mandatory enlistment until the age of 30. Since early September, more than 1,8000 people have signed a petition urging President Moon Jae-in to grant members of the K-pop band a special military service exception.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr account of Uyên Nochu

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Does Seoul Listen to Women on Women’s Issues?

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • The South Korean government advanced new legislation that would allow abortions until the 14th week of pregnancy.
  • Constitutional Court ruled in 2019 that an outright ban on abortion is unconstitutional.
  • However, the proposed revision falls short of calls by women’s rights activists to completely abolish the current anti-abortion laws.

Implications: The backlash from women’s rights advocates suggests that the government failed to sufficiently engage civic stakeholders when developing public policy. The move to revise existing laws against abortion faced significant pushback from conservative organizations. Nonetheless, the vocal rebuke of the government’s partial repeal of the anti-choice law by advocates of women’s rights – including those within the ruling Democratic Party – indicates that civic groups were not properly consulted.

Context: The 2019 ruling by the Constitutional Court challenged a 1953 statute that subjected women and the attending physician to a maximum of two years imprisonment for aborting a fetus. The Court’s dissent led to a public petition that called for the complete abolition of the anti-abortion law. Underscoring the public backing for pro-choice legislation, the petition raised over 230,000 signatures. This push is also backed by the fact that fewer abortions are being performed in South Korea. Between 2005 and 2017, pregnancy termination fell sharply from 342,400 to 168,700.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the flickr account of GiulioBig

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Labor Rights as Public Health Policy

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

  • A Seoul court recently upheld bans on rallies of more than 10 people in an effort to contain the COVID-19 outbreak.
  • Meanwhile, seven parcel delivery workers have died so-far in 2020 from overwork, as the coronavirus outbreak led to a sharp surge in the parcel delivery demand.
  • In August, 2,000 people attended a rally organized by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to protest current working conditions.

Implications: The South Korean government’s strict adherence to social distancing might stymie efforts by key stakeholders and civic actors to improve public health. For instance, the KCTU claims that many delivery companies have not invested in sufficient preventative measures to safeguard their employees from COVID-19. In addition, other labor advocates point out that there are pressing safety issues in the workplace that need to be addressed beyond COVID-19. In this environment, the South Korean government’s view that civic engagement and public health are mutually exclusive might be misplaced.

Context: Increased strictness around social gatherings came as South Korea recorded the highest number of cases it has seen since March, raising concerns that COVID-19 might spread more aggressively during the country’s Chuseok holidays. Widespread public scrutiny of radical churches that contributed to recent cluster infections have helped strengthen the government’s case for stricter punishment of people participating in mass rallies.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user odius kim

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About The Peninsula

The Peninsula blog is a project of the Korea Economic Institute. It is designed to provide a wide ranging forum for discussion of the foreign policy, economic, and social issues that impact the Korean peninsula. The views expressed on The Peninsula are those of the authors alone, and should not be taken to represent the views of either the editors or the Korea Economic Institute. For questions, comments, or to submit a post to The Peninsula, please contact us at ts@keia.org.