This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Last week, South Korea began requiring incoming travelers from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the Philippines to submit negative coronavirus tests when picking up their plane tickets. Flights from those countries are also limited to 60 percent capacity.
• Coronavirus cases from overseas remain a persistent problem, with a four-month high of 43 cases reported on July 13. On the same day, U.S. Forces Korea reported 11 new coronavirus cases among American service members.
• Health officials attributed the rise in imported cases to Korean factories hiring foreign workers, but the city government of Pyeongtaek, home to the largest overseas U.S. military base, is calling for American soldiers to also be tested before arrival.

Implications: South Korea reveals its foreign policy preferences through its differentiated treatment of U.S. nationals compared to citizens of other countries in its ongoing effort to address the public health challenge. While American service members make up a substantial number of South Korea’s imported coronavirus cases, the South Korean government has not taken any actions to restrict their travel into the country. This contrasts the response in Okinawa where a rapidly growing outbreak among American servicemembers prompted Governor Danny Tamaki to demand tougher preventative measures from the U.S. military. Meanwhile, migrant workers from other Asian countries have faced tougher scrutiny.

Context: The countries targeted by the new pre-arrival testing requirement were described by the government as high-risk, but the list does not include the United States, India, Brazil, or Russia, which have the world’s largest coronavirus outbreaks. Instead, the list appears focused on countries with coronavirus problems that also send significant numbers of migrant workers to Korea. Vietnam, Thailand, and China, which have large numbers of citizens working in South Korea but are not facing high levels of virus transmission, were not affected by the new restriction.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of James Constant and Sonia Kim.

Picture from flickr user ƒliçkrwåy

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• As domestic supplies of face masks stabilized, the government will allow the public to send more masks to families living abroad, especially in countries where mask supplies are scarce.
• Starting June 25, South Koreans have been permitted to send up to 12 face masks per person every month to relatives overseas regardless of their citizenship status.
• Under this new policy, family members who are non-South Korean citizens can now receive masks manufactured in South Korea. This includes Koreans adopted overseas as well as parents and children of those who immigrated to Korea via marriage.

Implications: The revisions to rules on who is eligible to receive face masks from South Korean nationals may reflect society’s views on who is considered part of the pan-Korean community. Most notably, the new rules no longer require recipients to be South Korean citizens. While not a conclusive signal of how the country as a whole treats nationality, it may hint at a more inclusive interpretation of what it means to be Korean.

Context: A In early March, the South Korean government banned the export of face masks as a necessary measure to ease domestic supply shortages. An exception to this restriction was made for South Korean citizens who lived overseas. According to Korea Customs Service, South Korean nationals sent more than 5.02 million masks to family members abroad between March 24 and June 19.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of James Constant, Sonia Kim, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from the user Republic of Korea on Flickr 

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The South Korean government recently launched a mandatory quick response (QR) code system to log visitors at high-risk entertainment facilities as part of its latest efforts to curb the spread of the coronavirus outbreak.
• This decision came after authorities struggled to trace people who had visited nightclubs and bars in Seoul’s Itaewon district, where clusters of new cases were detected.
• According to South Korea’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), personal data collected from the QR codes, which includes full names and phone numbers, will be encrypted and destroyed after four weeks.

Implications: The pushback around the adoption of QR code-based tracing system suggests that the policy-making process excluded many public health experts and privacy advocates. Although the government remains buoyed by strong public support, the adoption of the latest tech tools to combat COVID-19 raised questions about the policymaking process from some medical experts. Privacy advocates also raised worries about this latest tech initiative. This further suggests that the government has inadequately explained its rationale for the trade-off between privacy and public health to key civic organizations.

Context: In May, South Korea was in the international spotlight for slowing the spread of COVID-19 without instituting a lockdown. Many nations studied South Korea’s approach to containment. However, a resurgence of infections has raised questions about the effectiveness of Korea’s policies to-date. Although South Korea saw a much larger spike of infections in February and March, those were much easier to track because a majority of the cases were concentrated in a single community of church-goers in the city of Daegu.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of James Constant, Soojin Hwang, Sonia Kim, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user Republic of Korea

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• On January 9, South Korea passed amendments to three major data privacy laws, which permit the commercial use of data of unidentified individuals without seeking their consent.
• A recent government-sponsored survey revealed that 77.5 percent of respondents were comfortable with providing personal information under an alias.
• This represents a major shift from November 2019 when a survey conducted by a civic organization showed that 66.7 percent of respondents were against providing their personal information even if their identity was anonymized.

Implications: The government’s use of big data to fight coronavirus has softened the South Korean people’s concerns over data privacy. This change in public attitude is reflected in the passage of key amendments that allow the commercial use or provision of personal data without consent if the identity of the data subject is concealed. The bill was highly controversial when it was first introduced in 2018 and faced opposition from several civic organizations over concerns that the data might be breached or misused. However, a recent survey revealed that South Koreans are feeling more confident about sharing their anonymized personal data. The stark change of public sentiment toward data provision reflects public approval of the government’s use of personal data for contact tracing to battle COVID-19.

Context: The government’s use of personal information to contain the COVID-19 outbreak was only possible due to a legal framework that was implemented after the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015. After the South Korean government’s mishandling of the outbreak, new rules were established to provide specific guidelines and procedures for collecting personal data during public health emergencies. In addition, the government has been working to address public concerns around data privacy.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user Takashi Nakajima

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• To address the growing number of COVID-19 cases, the government temporarily adopted telemedicine in late February, which is banned by the Medical Service Act.
• The majority of patients were satisfied with the remote access to healthcare, while most healthcare providers characterized the service as “inconvenient.”
• Following the government’s announcement that it will revive the economy through digitalization, share prices of companies related to telemedicine skyrocketed.
• However, revision of the Medical Service Act to legalize telemedicine was not included in the government’s blueprint for Korean New Deal which was released on May 7.

Implications: Despite the government’s mobilization of new medical technologies during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak, interest groups have hindered the formal adoption of some novel approaches to public health. This contradicts South Korea’s international reputation as a technocratic state and a leader in telecommunication technology. There were expectations that the use of telemedicine to address the surge in coronavirus patients would create momentum for their full adoption. However, the government continues to only approve pilot projects as opposition from the medical community continues unabated.

Context: The medical community has lobbied against the adoption of doctor-to-patient remote medical treatment for the past two decades. Although South Korea has been conducting pilot tests with telemedicine since 2000, there have not been any procedural movements towards their legalization. A revision to the Medical Service Act that would allow remote treatment has been repeatedly voted down in the legislature due to strong push back from the medical community. While some medical professionals support the adoption of telemedicine, the Korea Medical Association (KMA), the country’s largest organization of medical doctors, appears unlikely to change its opposition.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user YJ-Lee

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Lawmakers are debating the scope of the proposed funds for relief from the COVID-19 crisis.
• The ruling Democratic Party (DP) argued for extending support to all households. But the administration and the opposition party opposed this proposal, citing strains on the state’s fiscal health.
• To persuade the administration, DP lawmakers proposed “voluntary contribution of the payouts by high-income earners” as a means to reduce the cost burdens of the disaster relief fund.
• On April 22, Prime Minister Chung Sye-kyun announced that the administration would accept DP’s proposal if the National Assembly reaches an agreement and comes up with a plan to make voluntary contributions of payouts possible.

Implications: The government’s belief that high-income earners would return their share of the emergency relief fund reveals policymakers’ trust in the Korean public’s sense of civic duty. Critics have pointed out that relying on volunteerism is not sound policy-making. However, DP lawmakers are confident that people will contribute their share if civic leaders and influencers set an example. In addition, there are tax incentives for those who take this action. DP lawmakers also point to ongoing public campaigns to raise money for the emergency relief fund as evidence of the people’s volunteerism.

Context: South Korea’s past experiences validate the government’s belief that people would make significant sacrifices. When the country’s economy ran out of foreign reserve currency during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, South Koreans launched a national gold-collecting campaign. In the first quarter of 1998, 2.43 million people participated in this campaign and collected 1.65 tons of gold which resulted in earning USD 2.2 billion worth of foreign currency to pay back the International Monetary Fund.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture depicting the 1998 gold collection movement from user ClubCapetown on flickr

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• In early April, the operator of South Korea’s biggest food delivery application “Baedal Minjok (Baemin)” began charging restaurant owners and franchisees a 5.8 percent commission for every online order.
• Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung criticized Baemin and pushed for the launch of a public food-delivery app that would benefit delivery workers, restaurant owners, and app engineers. Many local governments announced similar plans to develop a public delivery application.
• In March, the southwestern city of Gunsan launched a public food-delivery app that does not charge restaurant owners commission, advertising, or subscription fees.

Implications: The COVID-19 outbreak has created an environment where local governments can expand their policy toolkit and intervene in the market as a direct competitor to private companies. In response to fee increases on the delivery app Baemin, many local governments have indicated their intention to develop a competing platform. This proactiveness is consistent with other recent measures taken by local governments to boost consumer demand. Most notably, authorities have been issuing local currency to bolster demand and mitigate the economic fallout anticipated from the spread of COVID-19.

Context: Local government intervention in the delivery service was helped by growing public opinion that opposes Baemin’s growing market power. Currently, the Fair Trade Commission is reviewing whether to approve the merger of Baemin by the German company Delivery Hero, which operates food delivery applications Yogiyo and Baedal Tong. If the three companies come under a single banner, this company would account for 99 percent of the delivery app market in South Korea.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture by user Kimhs5400 from Wikimedia Commons

By Ingyeong Park

In the midst of a global pandemic, South Korea is set to hold a general election today.  This a major undertaking as South Korea attempts to thread the needle between ensuring suffrage to all eligible voters (including people who may be infected with COVID-19) and keeping uninfected voters safe from exposure. Measures adopted by South Korean officials, if successful, may provide a blueprint for how other democratic societies might hold their elections during a pandemic.

Early voting turnout

Contrary to predictions that the pandemic would result in a low voter turnout, early voting on April 10 and 11 drew 26.69 percent of eligible voters nationwide. This is the highest turnout for a national election since the introduction of the early voting system.

There are several speculations on why early voting turnout was so high. First, the coronavirus may have led to more talk about politics with family and friends. Second, voters may have opted to cast ballots early to avoid contact with others at polling stations on the election day. Third,  there are more competitive battleground districts. According to the Hankyoreh, early voting turnout was relatively higher in districts where high-profile candidates from the ruling and opposition parties competed against each other. For example, In Seoul, early voting in Jongro – where former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon from the ruling Minjoo Party and Hwang Kyo-ahn, leader of the opposition party, are competing for the district’s seat – recorded the highest turnout at 34.68 percent. In Suseong–gap, another competitive district in the city of Daegu, 30.18 percent of eligible voters came to the polls.

Preparations for the election

On the day of the election, personnel at polling stations will check for fevers with a contactless thermometer at the entrance. Voters will wear disposable plastic gloves after sanitizing their hands. After the fever check, those with body temperature above 37.5 degrees or respiratory symptoms will vote at a temporary voting booth, and the temporary voting booth will be disinfected immediately after use. Official personnel at polling stations will be required to maintain a distance of 1 meter between voters, and periodically ventilate polling stations.

The personnel will also provide language interpretation services through video calls for the hearing-impaired for the first time in Korea’s electoral history.

After the election, district votes can be automatically counted through a machine. However, proportional representation ballots will be counted manually because they are too long for existing machines. The voting and ballot counting will be broadcast live on the Korea Election Broadcasting System in real-time.

How do people who are quarantined vote?

According to the government’s guidelines, the government will guarantee suffrage for people who are in quarantine. Eligible voters who received a self-quarantine notice between April 1 and 14 can vote if they are not asymptomatic on the day of the main vote. When public voting ends, the government will temporarily lift quarantine from 5:20 p.m. to 7 p.m. for these voters to come to their local polling stations.

Officials hope that this separation between the movement of the general public and the self-quarantined would prevent possible transmission of the virus. A public official will accompany quarantined voters from their residence to the polling place to ensure that they comply with the rules. In addition, dedicated personnel wearing safety masks and gloves will manage the voting process at polling stations where quarantined voters will submit their ballots.

Ingyeong Park is an intern at the Korea Economic Institute. Ingyeong is a student at Ajou University, pursuing a degree in Political Science and Diplomacy. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

Picture from user Republic of Korea on Flickr 

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• 88,000 overseas South Koreans (51.2% of total overseas citizens) in 57 countries are excluded from voting in the upcoming National Assembly election.
• About 4,300 people signed a national petition requesting voting by post.
• There were appeals to the constitutional court and a social media campaign to guarantee suffrage for overseas residents.
• Overseas citizens registered the lowest-ever voter turnout of 23.8 percent.

Implications: In contrast to the rapid response by public health authorities to COVID-19, the South Korean bureaucracy has been less agile in responding to challenges to democratic rights that stem from the pandemic – even when their inflexibility appears to contradict the government’s own long-held objectives. South Korea has been expanding the base of eligible voters over the past several years, but the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that the government was insufficiently prepared to guarantee these rights during a crisis. In response to many local South Korean diplomatic missions suspending in-person polling, the National Election Commission (NEC) has not offered a realistic alternative for overseas citizens. In response to requests to submit ballots by mail, the NEC maintained that such measures are only applicable to patients, not to overseas residents.

Context: Efforts to expand suffrage have not been executed consistently. Voting rights were extended to overseas residents in 2012. But a proposal to increase the number of polling booths in 2019 was rejected in the National Assembly. Similarly, the government planned to educate 20,000 newly franchised 18-year old voters. However, these programs were canceled in the wake of COVID-19. The Office of Education recommended that students watch a video from NEC instead. This led to criticisms that the quality of education was superficial.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture by user 고려 from Wikimedia Commons

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• As the central government shares data on COVID-19 cases with local authorities, there have been incidents of patients’ private information leaking to the public.
• In response, a public petition was submitted to the National Human rights Commission of Korea to protest the usage of private medical data.
• There is currently support behind the government’s usage of medical data – but investigations have revealed that there are competing legal precedents on this issue.

Implications: The government’s response to COVID-19 revealed an unsettled legal question on the sanctity of individual privacy during a public health crisis. Following the government’s failure to share vital information on how the MERS virus was spreading during the 2015 outbreak, the National Assembly passed new laws requiring authorities to disseminate relevant public health information to citizens and local authorities during crises. However, this statute left many unanswered questions for authorities. While the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has guidelines that protect the identities of individuals, there are concerns that private details could still be deduced from the published data. Moreover, each local government has been publishing different amounts of information, revealing that guidelines on publicly available medical data have not been sufficiently standardized.

Context: Compared to the United States, South Korea’s legal code appears to prioritize public transparency. Despite calls for more localized reporting, New York only lists COVID-19 cases by age bracket, gender and borough. Local health officials note that they cannot disclose how many cases are found in each city because of the nation’s strict medical privacy law (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). Furthermore, health departments in the Bay Area make the case that releasing more granular data could heighten discrimination against certain communities where there might be clusters of cases.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user YJ-Lee