This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The South Korean government is considering new ways to enhance coronavirus-related privacy protections following increasing public concern over excessive data disclosures.
• This includes measures to remove phone numbers from handwritten visitor logs and an investigation into the functions of thermal imaging cameras with facial recognition.
• In the meantime, as COVID-19 infection clusters continue to grow sporadically, health authorities caution the possibility of another mass outbreak.

Implications: Even as the government continues to prioritize public health amid the ongoing pandemic, its efforts to also protect personal information show that Seoul is attuned to concerns around civil liberties. Despite frequent critiques (particularly from abroad) of its stringent digital surveillance, South Korea demonstrates a willingness to address public opinion and adapt its privacy protection guidelines around contract tracing. Underpinning the decision to revise these rules is the belief among officials that public trust and cooperation are vital for containing COVID-19. As such, policymakers recognize that successfully managing the health crisis is in part contingent upon ensuring a certain degree of personal privacy.

Context: This past summer, South Korea mandated businesses to collect customer information, including names and phone numbers, as part of its effort to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. High-risk facilities like restaurants, cafes, and theaters require visitors to submit either a QRcode based entry log or a handwritten form. Many people have started questioning the effectiveness of the latter and whether it may lead to unauthorized leaks of personal information.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Jens-Olaf Walter

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• There is growing anxiety around the new flu vaccine after the deaths of at least 13 people who received shots.
• These concerns led to the Ministry of Food and Drug and Safety recalling 615,000 doses of flu vaccines.
• Nonetheless, South Korean authorities refused to suspend the country’s seasonal inoculation program, citing no causal links between flu shots and recent deaths.

Implications: Despite the South Korean government’s prompt response to the COVID-19 outbreak, public confidence in its public health policy remains fragile. The flu vaccine program failed to meet the heightened expectations set by the country’s successful mobilization of resources to manufacture and distribute COVID-19 test kits. This shortcoming may remind people of past cases when the Korean government failed to sufficiently protect the public from both natural and man-made disasters. More presently, the public’s skepticism of the system raises questions on its receptivity to the forthcoming COVID vaccine.

Context: In 2015, the Park Geun-hye administration was deeply criticized for its slow response to the deadly outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. Officials failed to share important information about the disease and its spread with key actors in the public health infrastructure, which led to higher infection rates and more deaths. Beyond health concerns, Korea continues to experience occasional high-profile public safety failures. These experiences may generate concerns that the government’s quick tackling of COVID-19 was an exception rather than the rule.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Republic of Korea

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• A Seoul court recently upheld bans on rallies of more than 10 people in an effort to contain the COVID-19 outbreak.
• Meanwhile, seven parcel delivery workers have died so-far in 2020 from overwork, as the coronavirus outbreak led to a sharp surge in the parcel delivery demand.
• In August, 2,000 people attended a rally organized by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to protest current working conditions.

Implications: The South Korean government’s strict adherence to social distancing might stymie efforts by key stakeholders and civic actors to improve public health. For instance, the KCTU claims that many delivery companies have not invested in sufficient preventative measures to safeguard their employees from COVID-19. In addition, other labor advocates point out that there are pressing safety issues in the workplace that need to be addressed beyond COVID-19. In this environment, the South Korean government’s view that civic engagement and public health are mutually exclusive might be misplaced.

Context: Increased strictness around social gatherings came as South Korea recorded the highest number of cases it has seen since March, raising concerns that COVID-19 might spread more aggressively during the country’s Chuseok holidays. Widespread public scrutiny of radical churches that contributed to recent cluster infections have helped strengthen the government’s case for stricter punishment of people participating in mass rallies.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user odius kim

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Over 4,000 delivery workers nationwide threatened to stop sorting parcels as a protest against heavy workloads ahead of the Chuseok holiday.
• These workers backtracked from the boycott after the Labor Minister pledged to increase manpower and improve working conditions.
• This year alone, seven parcel delivery workers died from overwork, as the coronavirus outbreak led to a sharp surge in the parcel delivery demand.

Implications: South Korean workers most exposed to the economic hardships in the pandemic economy enjoy the least amount of protection as the Moon administration’s progressive labor policies privilege full-time employees. The struggles of many delivery workers highlight the government’s lack of attention on issues of excessive work hours and unfair wages affecting part-time and gig workers. For instance, the recently introduced 52-hour workweek ceiling does not apply to these delivery workers. This reality persists despite President Moon Jae-in recognizing that delivery workers play a leading role in overcoming COVID-19.

Context: According to a report by the Korea Transport Institute, delivery workers are often on the job for more than 70 hours a week, sometimes without any breaks or time to eat a meal. Moreover, members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions claim that there has been a lack of preventative measures to safeguard the health of delivery service workers since the onset of the coronavirus. In fact, during the past few months, the Korean government appears to have been more focused on keeping the national economy intact by boosting the interests of both major corporations as well as small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from Wikimedia Commons account of Roadgo

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• In the ongoing investigation into whether Samsung manipulated stock prices to facilitate a merger between two subsidiaries, Korean prosecutors faced scrutiny for ignoring independent recommendations against an indictment.
• Domestic pundits now add that continuing the investigation into Samsung may strengthen hedge fund Elliott Management’s legal case against the Korean government.
• This comes amid growing anxiety that legal probe into the conglomerate could harm the broader economy already affected by the pandemic-induced recession.

Implications: Many domestic market influencers see aggressive foreign activist investors as a bigger threat than potential improprieties by domestic conglomerates. Citing international media reports, many Korean market commentators argued that the government’s ongoing probe into Samsung could strengthen Elliott’s lawsuit against Korea’s sovereign wealth fund in a related legal case. These activist investors were initially seen as potential forces that could help discipline perceived improprieties by large companies like Samsung. However, Elliott’s decision to sue the Korean government may have turned that initial enthusiasm into anxiety.

Context: Elliott Management was a minority shareholder of a Samsung subsidiary that were merged to secure Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong’s controlling share of the conglomerate. The hedge fund claimed that their buyout was underpriced, reportedly incurring losses as high as USD 770 million. It blamed Korea’s National Pension Service, another minority shareholder, for casting the decisive vote sanctioning the merger. This became the basis for the lawsuit against the Korean government at the Investor-State Dispute (ISD) Tribunal. However, the ISD rejected an earlier attempt by Elliott to access government files to bolster their claim.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from an article published in The Investor on July 10, 2017

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Pastors in South Korea claim that church-linked COVID-19 outbreaks have tainted the public image of churches in the country.
• Most recently, a church in Seoul emerged as the source of the country’s second largest infection cluster following a spike in cases associated with a religious sect in Daegu earlier this year.
• A 2015 Gallup Korea poll finds that more South Koreans, particularly those in their twenties and thirties, are moving away from religion.

Implications: Scrutiny of churches amid the coronavirus pandemic highlight how religious institutions are losing their social influence in South Korea. While Christianity continues to be the leading faith in South Korea, more of the country’s population is abandoning faith entirely. This is reflective of a national trend towards increasing secularism, especially among young people who often feel out of touch with religion. In fact, some Koreans find that churches are out of step with issues like abortion and homosexuality. And still others are critical of instances of failed church leadership. Thus, once considered to be an integral part of civil society, churches in South Korea are now seen as less relevant than they were in the past.

Context: According to the Pew Research Center, South Korea has the world’s third-largest age gap in religious affiliation. Less than 40 percent of those under 40 are religious while 63 percent of those over 40 are. Experts argue that young adults are too occupied by the demanding education system and job market to spend much time on religious activities.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from the flickr account of New Morning Korean Church

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Samsung’s vice chairman Lee Jae-Yong was indicted on charges of engaging in stock price manipulation, unfair trading and other illegal means to tighten his control over the country’s biggest conglomerate.
• However, the court did not issue an arrest warrant, raising doubts on the strength of the prosecution’s case.
• This coincides with Bank of Korea’s recent announcement that the economic decline in 2020 may be deeper than the previously expected contraction. It also lowered growth projections for 2021.

Implications: Adverse economic conditions created by the pandemic may prevent the Korean government from disciplining the country’s conglomerates. Although Samsung has been on the defense since revelations of its involvement in ex-President Park Geun-hye’s influence-peddling scandal, the company has leveraged the economic uncertainty to renew the argument that harm to the company could damage the national economy. More broadly, the COVID-induced recession has allowed conglomerates to justify layoffs without consultation with labor unions.

Context: The belief that disciplining conglomerates could negatively impact the national economy is widely circulated. In response, the Korean government has been highlighting the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the development and export of testing kits in the ongoing global health crisis. By presenting SMEs as competitive actors on the global market, the government may look to disarm the common argument that companies like Samsung are too important to face legal consequences for its behavior.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

From the flickr account of juan nuñez parilli

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The Seoul government has decided to include foreigners in its disaster relief payout scheme linked to the COVID-19 outbreak.
• Under this program, the city will pay up to 500,000 won (USD 421) to households whose income is below the median income.
• In June, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea advised that Seoul not exclude foreign residents from the assistance program without a reasonable cause.

Implications: Seoul’s decision to distribute relief funds to foreign residents is primarily motivated by its desire to relieve the economic stress of the coronavirus pandemic. Despite previous calls for the equal treatment of foreigners under the cash payout program, the municipal government had largely left them out of consideration. However, now that South Korea faces a new spike in COVID-19 cases, authorities are seeking to help more households cope with the potential financial fallout from the virus. This indicates that the government is more concerned about keeping the country’s economy afloat than it is about discriminating against its foreign population.

Context: In March, the South Korean government granted coronavirus relief funds to 70% of the country’s households. This plan excluded a majority of foreigners from receiving the one-time cash support, with the exception of those who are married to Korean citizens or hold permanent residency visas. Foreigners and migrant workers living in South Korea were the first to be hit economically by COVID-19, as many of them fill jobs with poor working conditions in the manufacturing, agricultural, and fishing sectors.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

From the flickr account of the Republic of Korea

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The National Assembly has approved three supplementary budgets worth nearly USD 50.5 billion combined, setting a record high of total USD 431 billion of annual expense.
• Despite these increases, Korea’s debt to GDP ratio of 43.5% remains below the OECD average (109.2%) and that of other peer economies like the United States (106.9%), France (122.5%), and Japan (224.1%).
• Nonetheless, government officials raised alarm over the fact that debt is growing faster in 2020 than during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.

Implications: Both the residual trauma from the 1997 financial crisis and the looming demographic change may affect South Korea’s future efforts to stimulate the economy. Some policymakers fear that the debt growth might erode investor confidence in the Korean market as it had during the 1990s. Even with emphasis from the International Monetary Fund that a growing government debt ratio is both desired and anticipated, there are additional fears that Korea’s currently robust fiscal capacity should be preserved for future spending on the country’s aging population. With these limitations, policy discussions in the near future on further stimulating the economy may become more contentious.

Context: When Western lenders began withdrawing money from Asia in the summer of 1997, South Korea’s debt-to-GDP grew 4.3%, which panicked investors and accelerated capital outflows. The subsequent crisis in South Korea left deep social scars: unemployment rate tripled and 80% of households experienced lower income. The current debt-to-GDP is growing at 5.5%, which has led to understandable alarm among domestic policymakers.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Mark Hanna

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The South Korean government’s medical reform plan proposes to raise admission quotas at medical schools by 400 annually from 3,058 to 3,458 for a decade starting 2022.
• Seoul’s plan addresses data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that South Korea has fewer clinical physicians per capita (2.4 per 1,000) than the member countries’ average (3.5).
• In response to these proposed measures, the Korean Medical Association (KMA) threatened to go on a 3-day strike.

Implications: The KMA’s work stoppage threat reflects the Korean government’s tendency to pursue metric-driven objectives without fully consulting domestic stakeholders in the policy making process. Medical professionals argue that the government’s proposals drive up competition between doctors without addressing underlying discrepancies that yield variations in health outcomes between regions. While the government has sought to talk with the medical community on these issues, the loss of trust will now be difficult to amend.

Context: In June, the Korean government introduced a mandatory quick response (QR) code system in order to trace and prevent the spread of COVID-19 in high-risk indoor facilities. This new system was introduced with great urgency in response to a new outbreak among club goers in Seoul. However, many public health experts and privacy advocates raised questions around the effectiveness of this new tool. This suggested that the Korean government inadequately explained its rationale for the trade-off between privacy and public health, among other concerns, to key civic organizations.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Sophie Joo, Sonia Kim, and Chris Lee.

Picture from flickr user Republic of Korea