This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• On January 9, South Korea passed amendments to three major data privacy laws, which permit the commercial use of data of unidentified individuals without seeking their consent.
• A recent government-sponsored survey revealed that 77.5 percent of respondents were comfortable with providing personal information under an alias.
• This represents a major shift from November 2019 when a survey conducted by a civic organization showed that 66.7 percent of respondents were against providing their personal information even if their identity was anonymized.

Implications: The government’s use of big data to fight coronavirus has softened the South Korean people’s concerns over data privacy. This change in public attitude is reflected in the passage of key amendments that allow the commercial use or provision of personal data without consent if the identity of the data subject is concealed. The bill was highly controversial when it was first introduced in 2018 and faced opposition from several civic organizations over concerns that the data might be breached or misused. However, a recent survey revealed that South Koreans are feeling more confident about sharing their anonymized personal data. The stark change of public sentiment toward data provision reflects public approval of the government’s use of personal data for contact tracing to battle COVID-19.

Context: The government’s use of personal information to contain the COVID-19 outbreak was only possible due to a legal framework that was implemented after the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015. After the South Korean government’s mishandling of the outbreak, new rules were established to provide specific guidelines and procedures for collecting personal data during public health emergencies. In addition, the government has been working to address public concerns around data privacy.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user Takashi Nakajima

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The Blue House confirmed that a “Green New Deal” would be a component of a Korean New Deal that President Moon announced on May 10.
• This confirmation followed urging from the environmental group Greenpeace for Moon to set a positive example for combating climate change as South Korea addresses the economic downturn caused by the pandemic.
• The Moon government has already pledged to implement a nation-wide emissions cap and put Korea on a path to becoming a zero-emissions country by 2050.

Implications: South Korea’s current environmental policy aims are emerging out of foundations laid by economic initiatives of previous administrations. Although Presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak advanced “green” plans that were primarily aimed at boosting economic growth, their initiatives ensured that the government’s pro-environment posture would be closely associated with economic growth. Moreover, it cultivated stakeholders who would push the government to do more to reduce the country’s carbon emissions. Moon Jae-in’s ongoing efforts are further helped by the widespread recognition that increased public investment is vital to the post-COVID economic recovery.

Context: In his 2008 inauguration speech, President Lee Myung-bak highlighted his vision of employing green technology to overcome the ongoing global financial crisis. During the Park Geun-hye administration, the government continued to promote green technology as a vehicle to boost the economy. During this period, the Korea Electric Power Corporation advanced an initiative to improve the country’s energy efficiency by integrating smart technology into the electricity grid. The investment in smart electrical grid helped set the stage for additional investments in renewable energy sources including solar energy, energy storage, and electron volt chargers.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr account of Republic of Korea

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• In April, Prime Minister Chung Sye-kyun accepted the suggestion from the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to form a new consultative organization that better highlights union voices.
• On May 1, President Moon signaled his support for the inclusion of labor unions in this body by underscoring the importance of solidarity with the labor community on social media.
• On May 11, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) agreed to participate in the consultative process. This will be the first time in 21 years that both KCTU and FKTU would be represented in the same committee.

Implications: The Moon administration’s proactive effort to include labor unions as stakeholders in public policy reflects the government’s outlook on the severity of the economic challenges ahead. Notably, the Korean government took unprecedented action to reconcile the FKTU and the KCTU, creating the basis for their joint participation in the consultative committee. Public dialogue emphasized that the active participation of these key stakeholders is necessary to implement drastic and tangible changes to the labor market as part of President Moon’s so-called “Korean New Deal.” In addition, the urgency reflects the administration’s view that the post-COVID headwinds are not navigable without unity in purpose among these various institutions.

Context: KCTU and FKTU have long maintained different political positions. Because the KCTU had been absent from the Korea Tripartite Commission in 1998, the relatively-moderate FKTU represented labor’s position in the public policy discussions. During the Park Geun-hye administration, relations between the FKTU and the government was damaged after the government implemented reforms despite strong opposition from the union. As a consequence, there had been little dialogue between labor and the Blue House until the start of the Moon administration.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user odius kim

By Juni Kim

After three years in office, President Moon Jae-in finds himself in uncharted, positive territory. No prior South Korean president has maintained an approval rating above 50 percent entering the fourth year of his or her term, but Moon for the past three weeks has seen his approval ratings rise past 60 percent according to polls conducted by Gallup Korea and Realmeter, with Gallup Korea’s poll last week indicating approval at 71 percent.

The Moon administration’s deft handling of the COVID-19 outbreak in South Korea has jumpstarted his previously diminishing approval numbers. At the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis in South Korea in late January, Moon’s approval ratings were fluctuating at the low-to-mid 40 percent range. However, Moon has since made significant and steady gains among the South Korean public as his government’s efforts to contain the outbreak have so far been effective. In the latest Gallup Korea poll conducted on May 6^th and 7^th, 53 percent of respondents that approved of Moon indicated that the president’s handling of COVID-19 contributed to their positive response.

Moon’s public approval resurgence is remarkable on multiple levels. Moon had entered office with the highest approval ratings of any South Korean president in 2017 with over 80 percent approval, but as economic concerns increased and his efforts to engage with North Korea stalled, Moon’s ratings steadily declined before flattening below 50 percent throughout much of 2019. A political scandal last Fall involving the resignation of his controversial Justice Minister Cho Kuk saw his approval rating sink to as low as 39 percent. Beyond a bump in his approval ratings in early 2018 caused primarily by his diplomatic breakthroughs with North Korea, Moon did not have a significant increase in his approval ratings until March 2020. Moon’s recent successes in winning back public support were underscored by a historic voter turnout in parliamentary elections last month, which led to his party winning a supermajority in the National Assembly.

Moon is also bucking the historical trend of South Korean presidents that have generally seen their approval ratings drop throughout their five-year terms. Up until his recent surge, it seemed that Moon’s struggle to maintain his public support would not be too dissimilar from his predecessors. As mentioned previously, no previous South Korean president since 1988 has maintained an approval rating above 50 percent past their third year in office, and if Moon’s positive polling numbers continue he will become the first president to do so.

Even among other world leaders who have received public approval bumps due to their handling of COVID-19, Moon’s approval ratings rank among the highest. The polling firm Morning Consult tracked an average public approval gain of 9 percent among ten world leaders since the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 crisis a pandemic on March 11^th. In comparison with the Gallup Korea poll numbers, Moon received a 22 percent approval bump during that time, with only Australian Prime Minister Morrison (32 percent) and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau receiving a similar increase (22 percent). The bounce may be attributed  to a “rally-round-the-flag” effect that some leaders have received during national crises. It should be noted that of the countries included in the analysis South Korea and Australia have had the most success in reducing the number of daily COVID-19 cases with numbers dropping below 20 cases per day for the past three weeks.

Despite the recent increase in public support, the unpredictable nature of the COVID-19 crisis will likely complicate Moon’s path forward for the remainder of his term. Reports of a new outbreak in Seoul’s Itaewon district renewed fears of the virus and underscored the difficulties of managing a crisis that may stretch into years. The economic effects caused by COVID-19 and the Moon administration’s handling of their fallout will also play a significant factor in his approval ratings. Moon’s approval had previously sunk due to economic concerns, and this may happen again with disconcerting signs of slowing growth and trade.  And of course, there is the continuing puzzle of what to do about Kim Jong-un and North Korea. For his part, Moon remains undaunted in hoping to engage with North Korea. On May 10, he reiterated his hope for future cooperation on inter-Korean projects.

For now, Moon is in a strong position that has predecessors would have envied. With a supermajority in South Korea’s legislature and public support, Moon has political maneuvering room for the remaining two years of his five-year term. The COVID-19 crisis will continue to evolve and bring new challenges to his administration, but for now, Moon Jae-in appears far from being a lame duck.

Juni Kim is the Senior Manager for Operations and Technology at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.  

Graphics by Juni Kim.

Photo from the Republic of Korea’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• On April 15, South Korea held its 20th National Assembly election.
• The ruling Democratic Party (DP) and its satellite party won 180 out of 300 seats, while the main opposition United Future Party (UFP) and its satellite party won 103 seats.
• Lee Nak-yeon, former prime minister and a strong presidential candidate, won by a 20% margin against UFP leader Hwang Kyo-ahn who was also considered a potential presidential candidate before the election.

Implications: Power shifts between the two major parties over the past several election cycles suggest that Korean voters are more comfortable voting for the party in power. The recent trend diverges from the established assumption that voters tend to vote for the opposition party to check the ruling party. Since 2004, South Korea has seen more cases of the president’s party winning the legislative election or the candidate from the party with a parliamentary majority winning the presidential election. This year’s general election followed this trend, further encouraging the public to see it as a preview of the 2022 presidential election. With the DP’s three-fifths majority in the National Assembly, media outlets are openly speculating that former Prime Minister Lee’s odds in the presidential election have significantly increased.

Context: Since 2004, South Korea mostly had the same party in power in both the executive and legislative branches. In the 2012 legislative election, the conservative party won and then swept the presidential election later that year. The liberal party won the 2016 general election and liberal candidate Moon Jae-in won the 2017 presidential election after President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. Going further back, incumbent president Lee Myung-bak’s conservative party won the 2008 legislative election by a wide margin – and in the 2004 legislative election, President Roh Moo-hyun’s liberal party secured a majority in the National Assembly.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Photo from the Republic of Korea’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• President Moon Jae-in’s approval rating fell 5% between mid-January and the final week of February, according to Gallup.
• Conservative politicians have criticized Moon’s handling of the epidemic since the initial stages of the outbreak.
• A poll by Hankook Research revealed that 50% of constituents identifying as centrists disapprove of the government response to COVID-19.

Implications: While President Moon Jae-in’s approval ratings have fallen in the past 6 weeks, the impact of the coronavirus on people’s confidence in the government may be overstated. President Moon’s approval rating fell from 47% in the second week of January (before the first confirmed coronavirus case in South Korea) to 42% in the final week of February as the number of coronavirus patients grew to nearly 3,000. However, Moon’s approval ratings have been fluctuating between 39% and 49% since October 2019. Although additional polling suggests that the government’s handling of the outbreak may affect the voting behavior of some cohorts in the upcoming general election, Korean presidents commonly head into legislative elections with falling approval ratings.

Context: Fluctuating approval ratings of previous administrations suggest that public health crises may have less impact on voter sentiment than analysts assume. For example, President Lee Myung-bak faced the H1N1 outbreak in 2009-2010, which infected 700,000 Koreans and killed 260. Despite the high rate of infection, Lee’s approval rating grew to 54% during the height of the epidemic and still enjoyed 48% support by the time the outbreak was declared over in April 2010.

It is also true that every preceding South Korean presidential administration experienced a natural erosion of public support. About a month before the 2012 legislative elections, President Lee’s approval rating stood at a mere 26% – a shadow of President Moon’s current 42%, one month before elections on April 15, 2020. As KEI’s Junil Kim noted in a previous blog article, every South Korean president sees their ratings continue to fall as their term continues. In that sense, President Moon is actually playing with an advantage, having entered office in 2017 with historically high approval ratings.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Photo from the Republic of Korea’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• The Korea Institute of Public Administration (KADI) released results of a survey, which found that fewer public officials felt that they were developing new ideas to solve problems.
• The survey also found that satisfaction rates among civil servants had steadily declined over the past 3 years, although the numbers are still higher than where they were in 2013 and 2016 under the Park Geun-hye administration.
• Fewer bureaucrats believed that their agencies were taking risks to innovate – even though these offices outwardly claim to value creativity.

Implications: Enforcement of greater accountability in the civil service by the Moon administration may have had some adverse impact on innovation and bureaucratic flexibility – however, criticisms of these rigidities are also overstated. For the past three years, critics of the Moon administration had cast doubts on the effectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign, claiming that it was fostering a culture of passivity within the civil service. Declining morale among government workers appears to support this claim; however, it is difficult to solely blame the administration’s reform efforts. Satisfaction rates among public officials were even lower under the previous Park Geun-hye administration. Moreover, internal investigations and tightening of regulations have not prevented the incumbent government from rolling out “administrative innovations,” which include bold changes to the work hours of civil servants.

Context: President Moon Jae-in was elected in 2017 riding on widespread public support for greater government transparency. This public outpouring came on the heels of revelations that then-recently impeached President Park Geun-hye had used her office to exchange influence for cash. The main target of President Moon’s reform was the prosecutor’s office which the public perceived as the government body most responsible for abetting the abuse of executive privilege. Simultaneously, the Moon administration has sought to modernize the bureaucracy by adopting technology and providing expanded services to the public.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr account of USAG- Humphreys

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• Despite criticism from the ruling Minjoo Party and the minority Justice Party, the main opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP) launched a satellite party to gain more proportional seats in the upcoming legislative election.
• The LKP has also criticized the government’s decision to deploy USD 300,000 of medical supplies to some affected cities in China.
• Neither of these actions appear to have advanced the opposition party in the polls. For instance, only 43.9 percent of LKP supporters who were surveyed supported the launch of the satellite party.

Implications: While South Korean legislative elections are usually determined by the public’s outlook on political issues (such as the fairness of a party’s primary system), the coronavirus has shifted the focus for the upcoming contest to the government’s handling of the ongoing public health threat. This may deflect some criticism from the LKP, which has launched a satellite party to win more proportional seats in the National Assembly – a move that has proven unpopular with both the general electorate and party supporters. Simultaneously, the LKP’s critique of the Moon administration’s decision to send medical supplies to China does not appear to resonate with the average citizenry.

Context: The LKP is in a defensive position after back-to-back losses in the 2017 presidential election and the 2018 by-elections. The opposition party has ceded several key legislation to the ruling Minjoo party in the past few months, including the new budget and new rules lowering the voting age. The ruling party also faces the difficult task of overcoming a field crowded by both liberal and conservative splinter parties and securing a majority in the 300-seat chamber. The consequence of not securing a majority of seats would be greater challenges to President Moon Jae-in passing key bills that are central to his platform in the remaining 2 years of his term in the Blue House.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Photo from the Republic of Korea’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• As of February 7, South Korea reported 23 confirmed cases of coronavirus infections and medical teams are checking 1,234 suspected cases. In response, the government is ramping up countermeasures, including temporarily closing schools.
• South Korea enforced an entry ban on non-Korean travelers who have been to China’s Hubei province in the past 14 days.
• China’s ambassador to South Korea urged countries to follow World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommendations and avoid “unnecessary interference with international travel and trade.”
• On January 30, President Moon warned against consuming fake news about coronavirus and underscored that the creation of fake news about an urgent national crisis is a serious crime.
• On January 27, officials from the Blue House released guidance that called for the press to refer to the epidemic as “Novel Coronavirus” instead of “Wuhan virus.”

Implications: Domestic perceptions of South Korea’s relative position vis-a-vis its neighbors affect the public’s support for policies on transnational issues, like disease control. As the Moon Jae-in administration implements measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus, it must simultaneously address internal criticism that efforts have been restrained to appease China. Building on existing views that Korean liberal parties are pro-Beijing, critics speculate whether the government is attempting to appease Beijing with its cautious approach to expanding the entry ban for foreigners who have recently visited China despite the public’s concerns. Efforts to tackle anti-Chinese sentiment are also under scrutiny. For instance, the government explained that they are avoiding the use of the term “Wuhan virus” based on the WHO’s recommendation. However, some in the media have characterized this measure as a double standard, pointing out that the government has never regulated the use of terms like “Japanese encephalitis” or “U.S. flu.” Similarly, many critics suspect that the government’s unusually aggressive posture on fake news about the virus is to minimize friction with Beijing.

Context: President Moon has been working to improve relations with China after ties hit a nadir over Seoul’s decision to deploy a U.S. anti-ballistic missile battery in South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s possible visit to South Korea in the first half of 2020 is viewed as an opportunity for President Moon to bolster diplomatic ties with the country’s largest trading partner. In this context, the ROK government is likely aware of China’s sensitivity towards the treatment of its nationals since the outbreak of the coronavirus. For instance, Beijing has been critical of the U.S. government’s decision to ban the entry of foreign nationals who have recently traveled to China.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Picture from flickr user CiaoHo

This briefing comes from Korea View, a weekly newsletter published by the Korea Economic Institute. Korea View aims to cover developments that reveal trends on the Korean Peninsula but receive little attention in the United States. If you would like to sign up, please find the online form here.

What Happened

• On Lunar New Year’s Day, six people died when a faulty gas pipe exploded at a vacation rental home in Gangwon Province.
• Subsequent investigation revealed that the facility had been operating illegally and that the faulty gas pipe had also been installed illegally.
• The local government had promoted this vacation rental facility on its official website as part of its effort to grow tourism traffic to the province.

Implications: Despite increased emphasis on public safety from the central government, the inconsistent enforcement of regulations continue to create vulnerabilities. The Gangwon provincial government was prompted to engage in safety checks at lodging facilities after a similar gas explosion two years ago. However, regulators were unable to inspect rental vacation homes that were illegally listed as multi-dwelling homes. As a result of rigid regulatory interpretations, lodging facilities that potentially posed the greatest threat to the public were left out from routine inspections. This occurred even when the government had information that proved that these facilities were operating illegally. This case suggests that Korean regulators may be weighed down by bureaucratic rigidities and poor inter-agency coordination, creating obstacles for the consistent enforcement of safety regulations.

Context: The 2014 Sewol accident is the most notable example of a recent public safety failure. Laws were in place to restrict the dangerous practice of loading cargo above the regulated level. However, official inspectors failed to verify the specifications of the vessel Sewol after it was remodeled. This negligence led to the maritime accident that killed 304 ferry passengers. The disaster had major political ramifications as the Park Geun-hye administration was scrutinized for both shortcomings in preventative regulations and its poor handling of the disaster response. The recent resort accident shows that ensuring public safety remains a persistent public policy challenge in South Korea.

Korea View was edited by Yong Kwon with the help of Gordon Henning, Soojin Hwang, Hyungim Jang, and Ingyeong Park.

Emblem from the Republic of Korea government